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LABOR LAW-NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BoARD-EFFECT OF nm 
NLRB's R.EFusAL TO TAKE JURISDICTION-Appellant corporation was 
charged by the United Steelworkers of America with unfair labor prac-
tices in violation of sections 8(a)(l), (3) and (5) of the National Labor 
Relations Act.1 Although appellant's business affected commerce within 
the meaning of the act, the acting regional director of the NLRB declined 
to issue a complaint because the company's volume of business did not 
meet the Board's revised minimum "jurisdictional" standards.2 The 
union then filed substantially the same charges with the Utah Labor Re-
lations Board. The Utah Board's determination that it had jurisdiction 
l 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §§158(a) (1), (3) and (5). 
2 The NLRB's revised minimum jurisdictional standards, released to the press on 
July 15, 1954, are contained in 34 L.R.R.M. 75 (1954). Jurisdiction is made to depend 
on the dollar volume of business in interstate commerce. The standards vary dependin~ 
on the industry. 
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was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court.3 On certiorari to the Supreme 
Court of the United States, held, reversed, two justices dissenting. The 
proviso to section IO(a)4 of the NLRA offers the exclusive means whereby 
states may assume jurisdiction over matters which Congress has entrusted 
to the NLRB. Guss v. Utah Labor Board, 353 U.S. I (1957). 
The principal case settles an issue which has been of much concern 
to labor experts, whether states may assume jurisdiction of unfair labor 
practices covered by the Taft-Hartley Act after the National Labor Rela-
tions Board has declined jurisdiction pursuant to its minimum "jurisdic-
tional" standards.5 The majority ruled th~t Congress had pre-empted the 
field, giving the NLRB exclusive jurisdiction6 except when ceded under 
the proviso to section I0(a) requiring the state labor act to conform to 
the Taft-Hartley Act.7 This ruling was said to be based on the intent mani-
fested by Congress in passing the proviso to section IO(a) after the decision 
in Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N.Y.S.L.R.B.8 This seems a doubtful basis, 
3.Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 5 Utah (2d) 68, 296 P. (2d) 733 (1956). 
4 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §160(a): "The Board is empowered, as here-
inafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice .•. : 
Provided, That the Board is empowered by agreement with any agency of any State 
or Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any cases in any industry (other 
than mining, manufacturing, communications, and transportation except where pre-
dominantly local in character) even though such cases may involve labor disputes affect-
ing commerce, unless the provision of the_ State or Territorial statute applicable to the 
determination of such cases by such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding provi-
sion of this sabchapter or has received a construction inconsistent therewith." 
5 The NLRB implied in Breeding Transfer Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 493 at 497 (1954), 
that the state labor boards and courts could, in their opinion, assume jurisdiction after 
the Board declined to do so, but Member Murdock in his dissent (at 513) entertained 
grave doubts as to this. Many writers, both as a matter of policy and in terms of legal 
analysis of the amended act and previous decisions, thought the state government 
was left in a position to regulate the controversy. See Smith, "The Taft-Hartley Act 
and State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations," 46 MICH. L. R.Ev. 593 (1948); Smith, "The 
Supreme Court and Labor, 1950-1953," 8 S.W. L. J. 1 (1954); Cooper, "Extent of State 
Jurisdiction Due to Abnegation by NLRB," 8 SYRACUSE L. R.Ev. 58 (1956). But see Cox 
and Seidman, "Federalism and Labor Relations," 64 HARv. L. REV. 211 (1950). 
6 This exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB based on congressional pre-emption 
appears to be the culmination of a series of decisions holding that state labor boards 
and courts could not act on cases not presented to the NLR:B, but within its jurisdiction, 
because of either potential conflict with later Board rulings or actual conflict with 
an established policy. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N.Y.S.L.R.B., 330 U.S. 767 (1947); Lacrosse 
Telephone Corp. v. WER!B, 336 U.S. 18 (1949); Plankinton Packing Co. v. WERB, 338 
U.S. 953 (1950); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953). 
7 Because of the condition attached to the proviso that the state law must be 
consistent with the federal law before the NLRB can cede jurisdiction, no cession agree-
ments ,between the NLRB and the states have .been made. Principal case at 15. It has 
been argued that the purpose of the proviso to §l0(a) is to force states to pass "little 
Taft-Hartley Acts," but as yet no state has done so. See 50 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 190 at 
202 (1955); 5 UTAH L. R.Ev. 336 (1957). 
s 330 U.S. 767 (1947). This decision, decided ten days before the Senate bill con-
taining the substance of §IO(a) was reported out of committee, held that congressional 
pre-emption of the field precluded the New York Labor Board from certifying a fore-
!ll-en's bargaining unit against the announced policy of the National Board. The Court 
in dicta (1) refused to decide the problem arising when the NLRB declines jurisdiction, 
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however, for the Senate Committee report9 cited by the Court to demon-
strate this congressional intent was, in fact, silent as to whether a state 
may assume jurisdiction after it has been declined by the Board.10 The 
decision, nevertheless, can be justified either on the ground that the NLRB 
should not be able to do indirectly what it cannot do directly (give jur-
isdiction to states whose labor statutes do not conform to the Taft-Hart-
ley Act), or that, having expressed one method of conferring jurisdiction 
on the states, Congress probably did not intend for any other to be avail-
able.11 The Court noted, but did not decide, another extremely important 
question-the legality of the NLRB's refusal to take jurisdiction.12 While 
the discretionary power of the NLRB to decline jurisdiction under the 
original National Labor Relations Act had been recognized,13 the Court 
has never passed on this question since the enactment of the Taft-Hartley 
Act.14 Dicta in a Supreme Court decision,15 and two circuit court cases16 
uphold this power, however.17 
The effect of the Supreme Court's decision is to leave many employees 
without legal protection, state or federal, with respect to much of the area 
and (2) questioned whether the cession agreements then in existence were valid under 
their decision. The majority in the principal case reasoned that the proviso to §l0(a) 
was a congressional response expressing approval of limited cession agreements, but 
disapproval of a state's acquiring jurisdiction upon declination of jurisdiction by the 
National Board. The dissent, however, reasoned that §l0(a) was designed solely to ex-
press approval of the already existing practice of ceding jurisdiction by agreement. 
9 S. Rep. 105, P~. 2, 80th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 26, 44 (1947). The House committee 
report, not cited by the Court, on the House bill [H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st sess. 
(1947)] does state, however, that the jurisdiction of the NLRB is exclusive. H. Rep. 
245, 80th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 40, 44 (1947). This is explained by the fact that the House 
bill expressly stated that the National Board's jurisdiction was exclusive. 
10 For a different interpretation which could be placed on §IO(a) in regard to the 
Bethlehem case, see Smith, "The Taft-Hartley Act and State Jurisdiction over Labor 
Relations," 46 MICH. L. REv. 593 at 604-606 (1948). 
11 See 50 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 190 at 202 (1955). The paradoxical situation remains, 
however, that an area which Congress felt required both federal and state supervision 
is now completely unregulated. 
12 Principal case at 4. 
13 NLRB v. Indiana &: Michigan Electric Co., 318 U.S. 9 at 18, 19 (1943). Sec. l0(a) 
in both the original NLRA and the Taft~Hartley Act "empowers" rather than "directs" 
the NLRB to act. 
14 On the basis of §3(d) relating to the General Counsel and his duties, it has been 
argued that Congress removed the NLRB's discretion. 61 Stat. 139 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 
(1952) §153(d). See 50 MICH. L. REv. 899 (1952). 
15 NLRB v. Denver Building Council, 341 U.S. 675 at 684 (1951). The principal 
case cited this dicta after declining to pass on the issue. 
16 Haleston Drug Stores, Inc. v. N[,RB, (9th Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d) 418, cert. den. 
342 U.S. 815 (1951); Progressive Mine Workers v. NLRB, (7th Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) I, 
cerL den. 342 U.S. 868 (1951). But see Joliet Contractors Assn. v. NLRB, (7th Cir. 1952) 
193 F. (2d) 833. 
17 In Breeding Transfer Co., note 5 supra, Member Murdock of the Board argued 
that the true purpose of the stricter jurisdictional standards was to reallocate authority 
between federal and state governments, and that this was an unconstitutional usurpation 
of legislative power. The majority of the NLR.!B stated that the new minimum jurisdic-
tional standards were necessitated by budgetary considerations and the heavy case load. 
The result in the principal case destroys the .basis for Murdock's objection. 
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of regulation covered by the Taft-Hartley Act,18 for the states are precluded 
from assuming jurisdiction even when the NLRB refuses to act.19 While 
the Court noted these adverse consequences, it refused to consider them 
in reaching its decision, pointing out that Congress had recognized the 
existence of this potential "no man's land" but had failed to act.20 The 
present problem can be solved in three ways: state legislatures could pass 
"little Taft-Hartley Acts"; the NLRB could exercise its complete juris-
diction; or Congress could legislate. The first alternative appears most 
unlikely.21 Under present conditions, the second alternative is likewise not 
feasible because of the heavy case load of the NLRB.22 It would seem, 
therefore, that it will be necessary for Congress to legislate. Since the prin-
cipal case was decided, bills have been offered in both the Senate and the 
House which would permit states to assume jurisdiction when the Board 
declines it,23 but this type of legislation is subject to two criticisms: (I) 
it would give the Board the power to reallocate regulatory jurisdiction to 
the states, and (2) state labor boards and courts could not act until the 
case had been presented to and declined by the NLRB. It is therefore 
suggested that congressional legislation be directed toward limiting the 
jurisdiction of the NLRB to the area in which it is presently operating, 
and removing its discretionary power to decline jurisdiction.24 The Board 
would then deal with all cases substantially affecting commerce, leaving 
to the states those disputes predominantly local in character. 
Joseph 0. Sullivan 
John C. Dowd, S. Ed. 
18 See San Diego ·Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957), a com• 
panion case to the principal case in which a union, not management, was appealing a 
state court's assertion of jurisdiction. This case points up the fact that the decision 
"cuts ,both ways." See Breeding Transfer Co., note 5 supra, where the Board hazards 
a guess as to the number of persons affected by the new standards. 
19 A Michigan lower court, however, has recently taken jurisdiction to enjoin 
organizational picketing, although this is an area covered by the NLRA and although 
the NLRB had refused to take jurisdiction. The court argued that its ·failure to take 
jurisdiction would be to deny any process, and that this would be a denial of due 
process. John v. Grand Rapids Building Trades Council, (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1957) 26 U.S. 
I.Aw WEEK 2156. 
20 S. Rep. 1211, Pt. I, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 18 (1954). Senator Ives introduced a 
bill in 1953 which was designed to end this confusion and uncertainty by giving the 
state jurisdiction when the :NLRB declined to assert jurisdiction. S. 1264, 83d Cong., 1st 
sess. (1953). 
21 See note 7 supra. 
22 NLRB Chairman Leedom, however, in a hearing before the House Labor Sub-
committee indicated that the NLRB would attempt to alleviate the present situation 
by expanding its jurisdiction if Congress went home without legislating. 40 LAB. REL. REP. 
370 (1957). 
23 S. 1933, 85th Cong., 1st sess. (1957), amending the Administrative Procedure 
Act; H.R. 6432, 85th Cong., 1st sess. (1957), amending the Taft-Hartley Act. 
24 The House Labor Subcommittee indicated to Chairman Leedom, however, that 
the congressional legislation would direct the NLRB to exercise its full authority and 
would give the Board the appropriation and personnel to accomplish this. 40 ·LAB. REL. 
REP. 291 (1957). 
